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I
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, a new picture of the antitrust landscape has begun to
emerge. The dominant emphasis of the ever more popular view concerns the
ascendance of economics in antitrust decisionmaking and doctrine,
particularly in Supreme Court adjudication, which is leading the way for the
lower courts.' Moreover, it is not just economic analysis in the abstract that
supposedly has come to the forefront but the strand of economic argument
associated with the Chicago School. 2 The new insight thought to be
contained in this brand of economic analysis is allegedly responsible for the
doctrinal shifts that generally have narrowed the scope of antitrust liability.
This perceived trend has become all the more salient with the
appointment to the federal courts of appeals of the three leading academic
proponents of this "new learning"-Richard Posner, Robert Bork, and Frank
Easterbrook. 3 It is not the case, however, that these appointments are seen as
central to the movement in doctrine, which is thought to be most strongly
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Research. I have benefited from the comments of participants in the workshop at Boston University
and at the conference and from the research assistance of Debra Appel and Michael Sturm.
1. This article will not directly address the similar perceived trend concerning the antitrust
enforcement agencies-the Department of Justice and FTC-although much of the analysis
presented here would be applicable. Eleanor Fox's discussion of former FTC Chairman Miller
advances similar arguments concerning the role of economics and politics in deciding cases. See Fox,
Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission, Economics and Rashomon, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1987, at 36-40, 54-55.
2. See, e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago
School, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 319; Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925
(1979).
3. The most well-known and representative works include R. BORK, THE ANTIrrRUST PARADOX
(1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw (1976); R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANITUST (2d ed. 1981).
Each has also written numerous articles on antitrust, some of which will be discussed later in this
article.
For the most part, this article will not directly discuss the opinions of these and other recendyappointed "law and economics" judges. As yet, all but Posner have not rendered a large number of
antitrust decisions, and the group of cases as a whole has been sufficiently straightforward that it
provides little basis for assessing the likelihood that these appointments will have a unique and
profound affect on the future course of antitrust law. Instead, this article will focus on the Supreme
Court-the locus of most of the important developments-and on the commentary, of which the
writings of these judges constitute a significant segment. At least in the antitrust context, the implicit
assumption of this session of the conference and much of the rest, which suggests the merits of
focusing on the economic analysis of a handful of recently-appointed judges, is belied by conclusions
presented here to the effect that observed changes are largely inexplicable in terms of the application
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indicated by the Supreme Court's General Dynamics4 and Sylvania 5 decisions in
the mid-1970's. Rather, additional lower court judges of high visibility who
are favorable to the movement are predicted to have an important influence in
consolidating the Chicago law and economics revolution in antitrust doctrine.
The story just described is rather puzzling. Although frequent reference is
made to the contrast between contemporary Supreme Court antitrust
jurisprudence and that of the more interventionist Warren Court, little note is
made of the parallel shifts in the direction taken by the Supreme Court in such
areas as criminal procedure, the first amendment, enforcement of the civil
rights and voting acts, and numerous other areas of law. In light of these
simultaneous developments by the same Court-and typically the same
Justices-that are so well-known and frequently discussed, it is remarkable
that commentary concerning doctrinal changes in antitrust is inclined to
attribute the most recent swing in the antitrust pendulum to new economic
6
insight rather than to larger political currents.
Simply observing this broader context-which is virtually never to be seen
even in the footnotes of most recent commentary concerning these
developments in antitrust-is sufficient to cast serious doubt on the
explanation based on the Supreme Court's recent learning of economics,
Chicago style. 7 Nor can the simple story be rescued through a broader claim
suggesting that the law and economics perspective generally was responsible
for all the recent shifts in Burger Court jurisprudence. Although law and
economics has been applied to virtually all areas of law, 8 and although some
parallel developments do reflect more of an economic approach, 9 it would be
of more sophisticated economic analysis and instead largely reflect more general shifts in politics and
ideology.
4. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
5. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
6. Most examinations of the Burger Court's shift in antitrust doctrine make no mention of
related shifts in other doctrines, analyzing the Court's views on antitrust as though the subject were
sui generis. See, e.g., Markovits, The Burger Court, Antitrust, and Economic Analysis, in THE BURGER COURT
180 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudenceof The Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The
First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1982).

7. The interpretation presented in the text is not at all inconsistent with the Court's using
Chicago School law and economics arguments in its opinions as part of the written rationalization. It
is well known that countless reasons may be offered in opinions to support results reached
(sometimes unconsciously, sometimes not) on other grounds. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 100-04 (1930). Moreover, one would expect a court to cite academic literature
supporting a more general shift in position, even if the scholarship itself had little if any direct

influence. It also is not the case that the Burger Court was generally anxious to adopt economic
analysis as a general matter. (No substantial evidence yet exists with regard to the Rehnquist Court.)
For example, the majority in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), ignored Justice Stevens'
application of simple supply and demand analysis in determining causation in a standing inquiry, see
id. at 788-89 & n.6, instead choosing to characterize the connection as "indirect" and "merely
speculative," id. at 757-58. Numerous other instances could be offered, all suggesting that
interpreting the Burger Court's jurisprudence on the assumption that it has accepted economics as a
preferred mode of analysis is a far more problematic approach than one looking to easily identifiable
patterns in its results. Finally, later discussion in this article will indicate that the actual use of
Chicago law and economics in recent antitrust decisions is overstated.
8. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
9. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (cost-benefit formulation for
determining what process is due). More generally, Frank Easterbrook has claimed that Supreme
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extremely difficult to make the case that the broad changes in Supreme Court
doctrine are primarily or even substantially explained by these phenomena.' 0
This article indicates how the common portrayal of developments in
antitrust doctrine is mistaken and misleading. Part II questions whether there
really has been a significant change in the use of economic analysis when
addressing economic issues that arise in antitrust. Part III casts doubt on the
implicit assumption that significant changes in the teachings of economic
analysis can account for changes in antitrust doctrine and perspectives. Part
IV considers the existence and meaning of a fundamental shift in the role of
economic issues in deciding antitrust cases-that is, whether economics has
officially been deemed the exclusive rather than merely an important objective
of antitrust. Suggestions that the landscape has thus been radically altered
are overstated, although there surely appears to have been some movement in
that direction. Yet, when the arguments of the first parts are combined with
an understanding of the history of the antitrust laws, it becomes clear that the
shift in both doctrine and rationale witnessed in recent years is fundamentally
a political, not an economic, phenomenon. As a result, the antitrust picture
blends rather comfortably into the larger canvas portraying legal change in
the federal courts.

Court Justices have generally become more sophisticated in economic reasoning. See Easterbrook,
The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Foreword]; Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJusticeor Economic Efficiency, 98
HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985) (reply to Easterbrook); Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply,
98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Reply]. The first two of Easterbrook's
economic criteria are most readily examined. He claims that courts should take an ex ante rather
than an ex post perspective-that is, they should primarily consider the effect of their rules in
governing future conduct rather than focusing on the equity it works in the case at hand-and that
they should apply marginal analysis rather than considering merely averages. Easterbrook, Foreword,
supra, at 10-14.
Both of these points (the first being more familiar) have a long history. For example, the first
amendment chilling effects concept (often applied in discussing overbreadth and vagueness) exhibits
a particularly strong emphasis on an ex ante perspective and the less restrictive alternatives concept
is an explicit use of marginal analysis. Likewise, the exclusionary rule has only modest force as an ex
post argument but has been strongly defended on ex ante grounds (and similarly for Miranda
warnings and many other criminal procedure requirements). There is surely room for argumentargument that would be most difficult to resolve-concerning the frequency with which such
"economic" approaches have been applied over the decades, but even if the trend has been toward
increasing use of such common sense insights that are frequently associated with economics, it seems
hard to believe that these shifts are primarily responsible for most of the significant movements in
Supreme Court doctrine over the most recent decades. (Note that Easterbrook does not insist that
his claimed rise in use of the principles he discusses explains the general changes in doctrine, see, e.g.,
Easterbrook, Foreword, supra, at 4-5; Easterbrook, Reply, supra, at 622-23 (indicating that he does not
claim that "application of the three normative principles leads to a determinate outcome in all (or
even most) cases"), although he does see his pattern strongly in antitrust cases, see Easterbrook,
Foreword, supra, at 58-59.)
10. The discussion of stated rationale for Supreme Court antitrust decisions in note 7 is
applicable to references to economic reasoning in other contexts as well.
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II
HAS THERE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE DEGREE TO WHICH
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IS USED TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC ISSUES?

Statements that the new law and economics has come to dominate the
Supreme Court's antitrust decisionmaking typically encompass some
combination of three subsidiary claims: Economic analysis is used more
frequently in addressing economic issues; economic analysis has come to yield
different answers to economic questions; and economic questions have come
to be more important in deciding antitrust cases. These three claims are
discussed, respectively, in parts II-IV of this article. The first claim
concerning the frequency with which economics is used in addressing
concededly economic issues is by far the easiest to assess and yields the
clearest answer. If one focuses on the last five decades-a span that includes
virtually all of the cases, many by the Warren Court, most despised by
Chicago law and economics-it seems rather clear that economic analysis
always has played an important and central role in antitrust decisions."I
The proposition that economics has long been accepted in antitrust,
although contrary to much of current commentary, is really quite familiar.' 2
After all, the most prominent works in the 1950's took a decidedly economic
approach, 13 even if one omits the work of the Chicago School.' 4 It has been
contemplated for decades, if not from the beginning, that economics would
play an important role in analyzing antitrust issues. In fact, the law and
economics movement of the past few decades is often thought of as involving
the application of economics to all aspects of law except antitrust, regulation,
and a few other fields-those in which the use of economics has long been
taken for granted.15
The most notable antitrust opinions over this time period rather uniformly
display the application of economic analysis, whatever one thinks of the
quality or content of the analysis in particular opinions. Consider first the
earlier decades. In his recent analysis, Frederick Rowe argues that the strong
connection between economics and antitrust doctrine was established in the
11. The content of that analysis is the subject of part III. A similar claim could also be made for
much of the first half-century of antitrust jurisprudence, although it is more difficult to analyze given
that economic analysis of industry was not nearly as developed at the time. Since most current
commentary focuses on the comparison of the last decade or two with the immediately preceding
decades, this article will largely be limited in a similar manner.
12. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 217-20 (1985).
13. See, e.g., J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
POLICY (1954); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959).
14. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Director
& Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 281 (1956).
15. For example, a large number of the recent texts on law and economics do not even have
index entries for antitrust, much less any significant treatment. See, e.g., C. GOETz, LAW AND
ECONOMICS

(1984); H.

MANNE, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (1975); A.M. POLINSKY, AN

INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983). The primary exception is Richard Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law, supra note 8, which devotes two of twenty-eight chapters to antitrust, a hardly
surprising fact given that one of Posner's primary fields has long been antitrust.
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1940's.16 That the heavy use of economics in leading antitrust decisions dates
back at least this far is amply supported by a consideration of the most salient
cases of the period. Learned Hand's opinion in Alcoa ' 7-- one frequently and
heavily criticized in the new law and economics of antitrust,8-is well-known
for its extensive discussion of market definition and its relation to market
power, one that greatly surpassed most of what had come before (and much of
what has come after) in economic sophistication. 19 United Shoe, 20 another of
the leading monopolization opinions of the earlier era that has been heavily
criticized by the new law and economics of antitrust, 2' is particularly known

for its heavy use of economic analysis. 22 The Supreme Court's Cellophane
opinion, 23

which

contains

one

of the most

prominent

and extensive

discussions of market definition of the period, relies heavily on economic
concepts, such as the cross-elasticity of demand. 24 In the merger area, Brown
Shoe 2 5 is the most criticized opinion. 26 Yet it is also known for reading the
rather ambiguous language of the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act-"in
any line of commerce in any section of the country" 27 -as referring to
product and geographic markets in the sense economists mean by those

terms. 28 Although the examples could be multiplied, 29 it suffices for the
purposes of this argument to have established the prevalence of economic
analysis in a number of the most prominent opinions of the era, and in
16. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics,
72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1520-22 (1984); see also supra note 11 (discussing whether it might have begun
even earlier).
17. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 52-52, 165-70 ("Alcoa opinion . . . stands revealed as a
thoroughly perverse judicial tour de force"); R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 206-07, 214-15.
19. See 148 F.2d at 424-27. The claim here is not that Hand's analysis is beyond criticism based
on the economic analysis of the time or that developed since, but rather that his opinion reflects a
serious and substantial attempt to apply economics to antitrust.
20. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
21. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 138-42, 170-73, 181-82; R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 202-06,
215-16.
22. Judge Wyzanski employed economist Carl Kaysen to assist him in the case. See C. KAYSEN,
UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORP. (1956).
23. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
24. This opinion, which favored the defendant, has long been criticized for misanalyzing the
question. Many commentators have found more persuasive the arguments in the dissent, which also
relied heavily on economic analysis and cited the most relevant economic literature. See 351 U.S. at
414-25 (citing Stocking & Meuller, The Cellophane Case, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 29 (1955)).
25. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
26. See, e.g., R. BORE, supra note 3, at 200-08, 210-16; R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 100-05, 129-30.
27. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
28. See 370 U.S. at 324, 335; see also United States v. Philadephia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 36263 (1963) (indicating that presumptive approach is "fully consonant with economic theory" and
relying heavily on economists and other commentators strongly influenced by economics). Once
again, the claim in the text only concerns whether economic analysis is employed in a substantial
manner, not the quality of the analysis or the conclusions reached.
29. For example, the much criticized case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard
Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949), see, e.g., R. BORE, supra note 3, at 299-301; R. POSNER, supra note 3, at
201-02, explicitly used economic grounds to justify a more lenient treatment of requirements
contracts than tying arrangements, despite identical statutory language. See 337 U.S. at 307-08.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. 4

particular those now most heavily criticized by the new law and economics of
antitrust.
Given this history, it would be rather difficult to imagine that antitrust
decisions of the most recent fifteen years could reflect a substantially greater
use of economics in addressing economic questions than was employed in
these earlier times. In fact, the more recent cases best known for signaling the
new direction of the Supreme Court exhibit a similar level of reliance on
economic analysis. Although widely heralded as indicating a new direction for
the Supreme Court in the merger area,3 0 analysis of the decision in General
Dynamics3 1 reveals surprisingly little change of any kind. That opinion is most
known for looking beyond simple market share statistics. The Court's
primary observation was that past market share was a poor predictor of the
future in this unique market. Companies with significant past sales of coal,
such as one of the merger partners in the case, might be of little competitive
significance in the future if they were almost out of reserves.
This point hardly reflects the application of new or particularly
sophisticated economic analysis.3 2 Moreover, the Court explicitly quoted
Brown Shoe-that earlier and allegedly anti-economic analysis opinion-in
support of its claim that it was appropriate to look beyond simple market
share statistics. 3 3 In addition, the reasoning behind this departure from
34
market share statistics is rather limited.
Nor did the dissent, consisting of the Warren Court holdovers,3 5 disagree
in principle with the majority's willingness to move beyond market share
statistics based on past sales to consider reserves. Instead it argued that
reserves should have been considered at the time of the merger, when the
now-depleted company did in fact possess substantial reserves. Furthermore,
the dissent suggested that the company's deep-mine reserves, although not
currently being mined, should be included because the company had previous
deep-mining experience. 3 6 Whatever one thinks of the merits of this dispute,
the dissent's position is hardly one that can be characterized as opposition in
principle to the application of economic analysis. General Dynamics therefore
37
involved no revolution in the use of economics in antitrust decisionmaking.
30.

See, e.g., Baxter, Reflections upon Professor Williamson's Comments, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 316, 317-

18 (1983).
31. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
32. Not surprisingly, the Court did not find it necessary to cite any commentary by economists
or others influenced by economics to motivate or support its analysis. The only such citations in the
majority opinion involve a passing reference to alternative rationales for the failing-company
defense. See id. at 507 n.15.
33. Id. at 498.
34.

See, e.g., id. at 500.

35. The dissent was written by justice Douglas,joined by justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
The only other remaining justice from the Warren Court was justice Stewart, the author of the
majority opinion, who had been a regular dissenter in Warren Court merger cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) ("The sole consistency that I can find is that
under § 7, the Government always wins.").
36. See 415 U.S. at 524-26.
37. Robert Bork seems to agree with this characterization, and finds it unfortunate. See R. BORK,
supra note 3, at 218.
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The most-cited decision in discussions of the rise of economics in antitrust
is Sylvania. 38 In at least one important sense, this case did involve a
substantial departure from the past: It reversed part of the Court's decision in
Schwinn. 3 9 Much of the Court's criticism of Schwinn was directed to its

formalism. This criticism had been emphasized previously by numerous
commentators, who did not base their arguments particularly on economic
analysis. 40 Of course, an important part of the Court's basis for permitting

territorial restrictions was economic arguments that had come to receive
wider attention. 4 ' Such reliance, however, is hardly a characteristic unique to
this opinion or to antitrust decisions generally. 4 2 Furthermore, the Court's
43
acceptance of the economic arguments was limited.

Some of the other more prominent antitrust opinions of the past decade
reflect the use of economic analysis while others show less evidence. 4 4 In any

event, it is clearly not the case that there has occurred a fundamental change
in the view of courts concerning whether economic analysis provides a useful
and important source of wisdom concerning antitrust law. Economics was
well received by courts and commentators alike long before the recent
emergence of the new law and economics of antitrust. If changes are to be
identified, therefore, it must be either in the content of the economic analysis,

which is explored in the next part of this article, or elsewhere.

38. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
39. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn itself had reversed
the earlier Warren Court decision adopting a rule of reason approach. White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). None of the recent commentators have suggested, however, that White
Motor demonstrates that the Warren Court had originally adopted an economic approach, only later
to be rejected in Schwinn.
40. See 433 U.S. at 47-54 & n.13.
41. See id. at 54-58.
42. William Baxter argues that "the insight that not all forms of rivalry are beneficial" is clearly
one that "the Court had never previously had." Baxter, supra note 30, at 318. This interpretation is
rather surprising. After all, the rule of reason adopted in Sylvania was that from Chicago Board of
Trade, see 433 U.S. at 49 n. 15, a case that six decades earlier upheld (rightly or wrongly) restraints on
rivalry as beneficial to competition. And the Court's earlier application of the rule of reason in this
context in White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 261-62 (quoting the same passage from Chicago Board), was
premised on this possibility. One could also note the cases upholding restrictive practices by
patentees, and many others. Interestingly, in an earlier statement defending the proposition that
"consumer welfare" should be the sole goal of antitrust, Baxter explicitly argued that the Supreme
Court in the 1890's recognized that there existed "categories of agreements which did eliminate
rivalry but nevertheless were permissible under the [Sherman] Act." Baxter, Placing the Burger Court
in Perspective, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 803, 804 (1978) (footnote omitted).
43. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 6, at 191 (noting three respects in which the economic
argument was not followed, but seeing the opinion as "a significant step in the right direction").
44. Frank Easterbrook purports to offer a long list of recent Supreme Court decisions that have
been strongly influenced by the Chicago School efficiency approach. See Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1696, 1698 n.7 (1986). Yet virtually none of the cases he cites
contain any significant economic analysis or reflect any significant change in approach. Many cited
portions explicitly rely on cases and principles long criticized by the Chicago School. And a few-in
the portions he cites--explicitly refuse to take approaches he advocates, in one case (NCAA) quite
directly, in that both the method and result he personally presented to the Court were rejected.
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III
HAS THERE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN WHAT ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS SAYS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
ANTITRUST CASES?

The question whether there has been a substantial increase in the use of
economics to analyze economic questions could be answered simply and in
the negative. The question addressed in this part of the article, concerning
the content of the economic analysis, is more complex. Section A describes
how there have been a number of changes in the methodology and content of
the relevant economic analysis over the past four decades. These changes,
however, do not correspond to those frequently discussed by the Chicago
School, and often run in precisely the opposite direction. Moreover, the
current content of economic analysis hardly provides the unquestionable
support that is often claimed for many of the Chicago School positions.
Section B demonstrates the lack of any direct, strong connection between
economic theory per se and the positions generally associated with the
economic approach. This section explores both the methods used to examine
markets and restrictive practices and those used to formulate legal rules (for
example, the preference for the rule of reason). Lest the argument be
misunderstood, the analysis presented here is not intended to be a thorough
critique of Chicago School economics; many of its teachings are useful, and it
is beyond the scope of this brief investigation to address thoroughly those
45
that are not.

A.

Changes in Economists' Analyses

At one level, the claim that there has been a significant change in antitrust
scholars' economic analyses of restrictive practices is undeniable. This shift
can readily be seen in the leverage context, which involves the alleged
extension of monopoly power from one market to another. Previous
simplistic views concerning the possibility of leverage 4 6 have been strongly
critiqued by the Chicago School, often with little effective reply. 4 7 It seems
fair to say that, in its simplest form, the original leverage analysis has largely
45. For discussion and critique of a number of the Chicago School positions, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 12, at 260-83; Kaplow, The Accuracy of TraditionalMarket Power Analysis and A Direct Adjustment
Alternative; 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817 (1982) [hereinafter Kaplow, Market Power]; Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985) [hereinafter Kaplow, Leverage];
Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984); Scherer, The
Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977); Williamson,
Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's Going, 27 ST. Louis U.LJ. 289 (1983). It should be
noted, however, that the cited critiques, although disagreeing with various aspects of Chicago School
arguments, often are equally critical of many of the positions taken by those targeted by the Chicago
School's attacks.
46. See, e.g., Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 516-17 (discussing and documenting the
prevalence of the traditional view on leverage).
47.

See, e.g., id. at 517-20 (reviewing the critique).

Page 181: Autumn 1987]

ANTITRUST, LAws

&

ECONOMICS, AND THE COURTS

189

vanished. Although the Chicago School position has been the subject of
48
much criticism, the debate has hardly been resolved.
More generally, despite the new law and economics criticism of many
traditional views, it is not the case that the Chicago School of antitrust simply
reflects application of the best and most current economic wisdom to the
economic questions posed by antitrust law. Quite the contrary, the "price
theory" widely hailed by the Chicago School as its heart and soul, 49 although
a useful starting point, is in fact the earliest and simplest form of economic
analysis of industry. 50 Much of the Chicago School commentary fails to
appreciate that divergent work by economists was a response to the
shortcomings of the simple price theory that Chicagoans hawk in competition
5
with these other economic approaches. '
One dimension of the change in economic analysis concerns the work,
which began in the 1930's and reached its peak in the 1950's, that involved
the intensive study of particular industries ("case studies") for the purpose of
gaining additional insight into their operation. 5 2 Richard Posner has noted
the difference between these two approaches and has criticized the case study
method for being atheoretical. 53 Yet case studies were not in line with
existing theory precisely because it was suspected, and then discovered, that
existing theory was itself not in line with reality. Because the general view of
the Chicago School of economics, best exemplified in Milton Friedman's
famous methodological article on the subject, is that theory is to be judged by
its predictive power, 54 one would think that the less rigorous ad hoc theories
of those involved in performing case studies would be applauded because of
the better match with reality. Such has not been the case. More importantly,
this criticism of case studies misses the mark. Part of the goal of case studies
has always been to learn from them in order to generate better theory. The
complexity and variety of industry has often frustrated those hopes, but that is
hardly a ground for criticizing the effort or for casting aside the valuable
lessons gleaned from such endeavors.
Another important defect exists in the Chicago School's attempts to cling
to simple price theory as offering the best insights for the new law and
48. See, e.g., id. at 520-26 (criticizing Chicago School economics arguments concerning leverage
and citing criticism offered by many others).
49. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 116-33; Posner, supra note 2, at 928-29.
50. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 16, at 1547. Robert Bork's view on this point appears to be much
the same, see Bork, inJudicialPrecedent and the New Economics, in CHANGING ANTITRUST STANDARDS 5, 56 (Conf. Bd. Research Bull. No. 144, 1983), although he later refers to the economic approach he
advocates as "really an intellectual revolution in the academic world," id. at I1. But see Breyer, in id.
at 6, 11 (denying revolution; noting that such arguments on resale price maintenance have been

around for twenty years); Fox, supra note 1, at 43 (describing change in FTC decisionmaking in
Reagan Administration: "Economic arguments compatible with less government (while known for
many years) began to command respect.").
51. See, e.g., Schmalensee, The New Industrial Organization and the Economic Analysis of Modern
Markets, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 253, 253-55 (1982).

52.
53.

See, e.g., id.
See Posner, supra note 2, at 931.

54. See Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in M. FRIEDMAN,
ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
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economics of antitrust. Theoretical advances in microeconomics during the
1970's and 1980's have greatly surpassed the simple price theory formulated
in the 1890's to provide an understanding of industrial practices. 5 5 Much of
this work, to be discussed in greater detail in section B, emphasizes the need
for dynamic rather than static analysis, as well as the need to factor in the freerider problem when assessing strategic behavior. These recent advances also
recognize the necessity of considering the implications of a variety of market
imperfections that, while known for some time, have only recently been
analyzed in sufficient depth to permit a greater understanding of their
implications.
There have indeed been substantial changes in the methodology employed
by economists studying industrial organization in the past decades, and the
new learning of economists has substantial bearing on the appropriate
content of antitrust doctrine. Some of this understanding favors the results
advocated by the Chicago School, some is in opposition, and much is too
tentative to permit confident conclusions at present. It is clearly not the case,
however, that the methods and conclusions of the "new economics of
antitrust," as embodied in the writings of the Chicago School, simply reflect
what is new in economic analysis that has a bearing on antitrust.
Against this background, it is interesting to examine briefly Richard
Posner's 1979 proclamation that the competing schools of antitrust analysis
had largely converged--essentially establishing a near consensus on a
moderate Chicago School stance:
I shall argue in this paper that although there was a time when the "Chicago" school
stood for a distinctive approach to antitrust policy, especially in regard to economic
questions, and when other schools, particularly a "Harvard" school, could be
discerned and contrasted with it, the distinctions between these schools have greatly
55. See, e.g., Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 949, 952 (1979);
Schmalensee, supra note 51, at 255-57. In a footnote to his article that is followed by Nelson's
comments, Posner sharply criticizes Nelson's argument in a rather surprising manner. See Posner,
supra note 2, at 948 n.69. First, Nelson is castigated for not being a careful reader of the relevant
economics literature. The claim is a bit surprising given that Nelson is a prominent economist and
has himself written in the field. Similarly, Mike Scherer, one of the leading industrial organization
economists, in reviewing Posner's book on antitrust, has noted Posner's failure to cite any of the
relevant economics literature that cuts against many of his positions. See Scherer, supra note 45, at
976 n.12 (connection between market structure and innovation), 986-88 (efficiency motivations for
mergers), 990 (scale economies in merger context), 991 n.91 (dynamic theory).
Posner then defends himself on the claim that the Chicago School ignores uncertainty,
information, and search costs by noting that two Chicago economists played important formative
roles in economic developments on these fronts. Although Posner's point is accurate, Nelson's
criticism presumably was not that no one on premises at the University of Chicago ever considered
such issues but rather that the analysis of Chicago School antitrust analysts has systematically
ignored or underplayed such issues. On that point, there is much truth in Nelson's claim. See, e.g.,
Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 527-39; Williamson, supra note 45, at 298-312.
Finally, Posner emphasizes that Nelson does not state that the new literature supports different
policy conclusions than those suggested by the Chicago School. On this ground, it is accurate to say
that Nelson's four-page comment does not articulate and defend an alternative antitrust program.
Moreover, much of the more recent literature, like much academic literature, is theoretical and not
explicitly geared to particular proposals and doctrines. It is rather obvious, however, that much of
the recent work of economists casts doubt on the Chicago School's conclusions, as many of the
sources cited in this article attest.
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diminished. This has occurred largely as a result of the maturing of economics as a
social science, and, as a corollary thereto, the waning of the sort of industrial
56
organization that provided the intellectual foundations of the Harvard school.

Moreover, any differences that remained he deemed "technical rather than
ideological."-5 7 This general claim, which he explains as resulting from the
abandonment of economic methodologies that diverged from price theory, is
difficult to reconcile with both the past and current work by economists in the
field. Posner does not, however, support his claim by referring to the work of
industrial organization economists. Rather, he notes that, contrary to the
state of affairs in the 1950's, the positions advanced in antitrust commentary
by the leading scholars addressing a legal audience today are often very close
to Chicago school positions. 58 In addition, he does not cite a broad crosssection of current literature, virtually ignoring those who disagree with him. 59
Much more recently, however, Posner appears to have adopted a far
different outlook. His new description portrays "three warring camps," one
explicitly divided from the others on social and political grounds-which
would appear to retract the claim of no ideological differences-and the other
two divided into competing economic camps-"a 'Harvard School,' prone to
find monopolistic practices, and a 'Chicago School,' which believes the same
practices to be for the most part procompetitive." 60 Moreover, he states the
belief that these differences reflect "deep and at the moment unbridgeable
divisions in ethical, political, and economic thought." 6 ' These statements
fairly describe the range of differences in antitrust today, including differences
in how economic analysis is applied and what conclusions are thereby
reached. The following section sketches some of the primary differences in
economic approaches and how they relate to the antitrust doctrines advocated
by different groups.
B.

Changes in Views of Antitrust Reflected in the New Law and
Economics

The Chicago School of antitrust has advanced the position that belief in
rigorous economic analysis is associated with their particular views toward
56.

Posner, supra note 2, at 925.

57. Id. at 948.
58. A large portion of all the references contrast the positions in the Kaysen and Turner book
from 1959, see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 13, to those in the then-recently published
volumes of Areeda and Turner's treatise, P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw (1978). Although

one could argue about the degree to which the Areeda and Turner treatise agrees with Chicago
School positions, that question is not central to the issue explored in text.
59. For example, the then-recent treatise by Sullivan is not cited. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977).

In addition, one would have thought that an author whose recent

book, see R. POSNER, supra note 3, had received a review by a prominent figure who disagreed strongly
with a large portion of his major claims, see Scherer, supra note 45, would be most reluctant to claim
that the school with which he was associated had achieved consensus, even if he had strong
justifications for disagreeing with such a review.
60. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 151-52 (1985). He cites his article on the Chicago School
for a description of the two camps, id.at 152 n.34, but makes no mention of the claim contained in
that article to the effect that the separation between the camps had largely vanished.
61. Id. at 152.
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antitrust. They offer opinions concerning the general operation of markets
and the effects of particular restrictive practices. In addition, the new law and
economics of antitrust is associated with certain preferences concerning
procedural rules and presumptions, most notably the general preference for
the rule of reason. The following two subsections consider whether the
advocated positions on antitrust doctrine can best be understood simply as
following from the application of economic analysis or instead as deriving
from particular inclinations of those associated with the Chicago School.
The Chicago School of antitrust
1. Analysis of Markets and Practices.
generally believes that markets are largely self-correcting. Restrictive
practices thus can be presumed to produce efficiencies rather than
anticompetitive effects. 62 Frank Easterbrook has claimed that "[t]he
fundamental premise of antitrust is the ability of competitive markets to drive
firms toward efficient operation. The entire corpus of antitrust doctrine is
based on the belief that markets do better than judges or regulators in
63
rewarding practices that create economic benefit and penalizing others."
But if this were the fundamental premise, there would be no antitrust law.
Antitrust law is necessarily based on the contrary assumption that courts at
times can punish detrimental practices better than markets will. As a result,
the tendency of the Chicago School to assume perfect markets 64 when this
may not be the case suggests that their economic analysis-even though
rigorous and accurate in itself-is not always that most appropriate to the
task. 6 5 One of the most widely-noted shortcomings of Chicago School
antitrust analysis is that it uses static models even when examining effects that
all exclusionary practices that are
are intrinsically dynamic-as in the case of
66
alleged to affect market power over time.
Problems with the Chicago School analysis can be illustrated by its heavy
reliance on the survivorship concept-the idea that only efficient practices will
survive in competitive markets. 6 7 Although it is not possible to offer a
complete discussion here, a few general criticisms should suffice to indicate
the shortcomings of the approach. First, and most fundamentally, because it
assumes that only efficient practices would survive, the approach largely begs
62. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); sources cited supra note
3; supra at 190-91 (quoting Posner).
63. Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 24 (emphasis in original), discussed in Kaplow, Leverage, supra
note 45, at 556 n.149.
64. The point is not that literally perfect markets are assumed, but rather that substantial
imperfections are often overlooked or given little weight.
65. See, e.g., Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 536-39; Williamson, supra note 45, at 298-312.
66. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 264-74; Kaplow, supra note 45, at 523-25, 527-31;
Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbroook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 83
(1984); Williamson, supra note 45, at 301, 304-06, 309, 311; Williamson, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 526, 528 (1979) (criticizing Bork).
67. The most explicit and thorough elaboration of this view in recent antitrust literature is
Easterbrook, supra note 62. For a general discussion of the natural selection model outside the
context of the survivorship of anticompetitive practices, see F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

38-40 (2d ed. 1980); R. Hansen & W. Samuelson, The

Evolution of Economic Games (Feb. 1986) (unpublished manuscript).
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the question for antitrust purposes. 6 8 This problem relates rather directly to
the previously noted tendency of the Chicago School to assume perfect
markets. Simply, one must ask why truly anticompetitive practices never can
survive. Strategic considerations combined with well-recognized market
69
imperfections make this query important.
Second, the Chicago School's use of the survivorship concept often
ignores or gives little weight to the question of how long the evolutionary
process takes. 70 If one had sufficient faith in self-correcting tendencies of the

market, even a ban on cartels would be unnecessary, although most Chicago
School analysts have stopped short of such a position. 7 ' Similar reasoning
also implies that market forces would tend to eliminate various forms of
discrimination rather quickly in many contexts. A substantial history,
however, as well as some current events, demonstrate that long time periods
may be necessary for the process to work. 72 That the problem may be largely
one of substantial delay rather than a permanent lack of competition hardly
73
renders antitrust unimportant.

A third problem involves the precision of the selection process as industry

evolves. When there are many practices and outsiders have difficulty
determining which are efficient, as the Chicago School would argue is often
the case, the process of imitation in the market will not function as quickly or
68. See Rowe, supra note 16, at 1549-50 ("Since nothing succeeds like success, that truism yields
neither operational criteria nor predictive norms, for its circularities bless what prevails in the end.").
Robert Bork surprisingly takes a rather similar position in explaining the merits of the price theory
approach: "Microeconomic theory rests upon a few empirical premises.... Once a few such basic
premises are accepted, the rest follows like a proof in geometry. The system is entirely circular,
which is its strength because circular logic is not rebuttable." Bork, supra note 50, at 10. He is
willing to make this statement presumably because he has utmost confidence in the premises of price
theory, but it is precisely such premises that have been challenged for decades by economists moving
beyond simple price theory. See supra section III-A.
69. See sources cited supra note 66.
70. Final judgments in antitrust cases can also take a very long time, which must be taken into
account in considering this issue. Despite this consideration, however, antitrust plays a significant
role to the extent a large portion of restrictive practices are deterred. In addition, in many areas
action will be rather quick, as in the case of mergers where prior approval is necessary. Finally,
considerations of timing are obviously relevant in fashioning procedural rules and presumptions as
well as in determining the scope of prohibited practices since the former regulations substantially
affect the time it takes to reach final judgment in fully contested cases.
71. The OPEC cartel offers a notable example outside the jurisdiction of United States antitrust
law. Although the cartel has often experienced difficulties and may finally be approaching its demise,
it is worth recalling that over a decade ago many strong believers in the market predicted that it
could never stay together long enough to have any significant effect. See, e.g., Friedman, The Economy
and the 1976 Election, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1975, at 80 ("[T]he OPEC oil cartel will break down....
The only question is how long it will take ....
[T]he chances are good that ... the cartel will begin to
disintegrate by 1976 and crude-oil prices will start to tumble.").
72. It also may be questioned whether it might have taken far longer were it not for antidiscrimination law. Many will dispute how significant discrimination ever was in the past or how
much continues to the present. For purposes of this article it suffices to note that there were
numerous instances of clear and significant discrimination that lasted for decades at a minimum.
73. In discussing entry barriers, Richard Posner notes the example of U.S. Steel, where the delay
spanned many decades. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 197-98, discussed in Kaplow, Leverage, supra
note 45, at 538.
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as effectively as it otherwise would.7 4 When the firm expects practices to have
much of their payoff in the future, and when there are numerous random
factors affecting the level of the payoff, self-correcting tendencies will operate
more slowly. Furthermore, with conglomerates, market discipline may have
75
less effect on the practices of particular divisions.
It would be a mistake to conclude from the limitations of the survivorship
process that market evolution has little or no tendency to produce efficiency.
What is required, and what much of the economic analysis responding to the
shortcomings of simple price theory attempts, is a more subtle and intricate
analysis of particular practices in particular contexts. Such examination
would permit one to determine whether the market's corrective forces are
sufficient to produce desirable consequences and, if not, whether there exist
legal remedies that offer potential for improvement. This view is far less
satisfying than the simple prescriptions of either the Chicago School 76 or
those who earlier took opposite positions, because it suggests that the most
appropriate antitrust doctrine may have to be complex and it may not be
possible to have great confidence in most conclusions reached concerning
antitrust. In this state of affairs, even modest predilections about the outcome
can produce substantial biases in the analysis, 7 7 so extreme caution is
necessary on the part of the analysts as well as the consumers of their product.
2. Formulation of Legal Rules.
Much of the argument of the new law and
economics of antitrust as well as many of the recent doctrinal developments,
both in the Supreme Court and appellate courts, has been directed toward the
formulation of legal rules and presumptions. For example, in areas such as
vertical (intrabrand) restraints and tying, there has been advocacy and
74. Frank Easterbrook argues, as an explanation of why antitrust defendants should not be
expected to justify their practices, that managers often will not know why they are doing what they
do. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 5-6. But see Bork, supra note 50, at 12 ("The businessman
knows which of these choices [enhancing efficiency or eliminating competition] he is making.").
Aside from serious difficulties concerning the plausibility of this position, see Kaplow, Leverage, supra
note 45, at 543 n. 118, the fact that even those adopting the practices are unaware of their purposes
or effects would make it even less likely that the market's natural selection would operate quickly or
effectively.
75. See also Scherer, supra note 45, at 986-88 (citing empirical evidence questioning the
effectiveness of the takeover mechanism in eliminating inefficient performance).
76. The desire for simple, concrete, manageable prescriptions may explain much of the
attraction to the Chicago School. See, e.g., Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on
Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1980); see also Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at
555-56 & n.149; Kauper, The Burger Court and Antitrust Philosophy, 1981 ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 12. For
example, William Baxter, a strong advocate of courts using more sophisticated economic reasoning,
insists on stopping short of having courts consider recent advances in economic analysis, for fear that
"'the lesson plan" for the courts will "become[] complicated so greatly." Baxter, supra note 30, at
320.
77. An important instance involves the bias that can result from the order in which analysis is
conducted. See Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 552-55; see also Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics
in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 575-76 (1986) (attributing
Frank Easterbrook's view to his selection of assumptions, a selection made on political, not economic
or legal grounds).
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doctrinal movement from a per se prohibition to a rule of reason. 78 Similarly,
there has been increasing support for requiring proof of market power in an
increasing range of contexts. 79 In addition, the requirement that a plaintiff
alleging predatory pricing prove that the defendant's prices were below cost,
appropriately defined, has generally been well received by the courts in the
past decade, although not without qualification. 80 More generally, analysts
advocating an economic approach have been hostile to considering evidence
of a defendant's intent when evaluating conduct. 81
In each case, the suggestion is that these results follow from economic
analysis. This subsection demonstrates how none of these results is the
necessary implication of an economic approach; in each instance, economic
analysis could be used to support contrary positions. The discussion here will
not, however, consider which positions on each question are most convincing;
rather it will be confined to the issue of whether particular results inhere in
economic logic.
The rule of reason might appear to have a natural affinity with economic
analysis because the rule requires consideration of all the economically
relevant factors, whereas the per se rule cuts analysis short.8 2 Yet the
distinction between per se rules and the rule of reason is much like the more
general distinction between rules and standards. With respect to that general
distinction, it has been long recognized that the choice often has less to do
with the goals of the particular system of rules than with the degree to which
more rigid rules will produce error and more open-ended rules will produce
uncertainty and impose additional cost in their application. It is precisely
such trade-offs that economic analysis of legal procedure demands be made. 83
78. Sylvania reversed Schwinn on the per se illegality of vertical territorial restraints, see supra at
187, although vertical price restraints are still per se illegal, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
761 n.7 (1984) (Court refusing to reconsider per se rule in that case), despite advocacy to the
contrary, see, e.g., Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8-14 (1981). Abolition of the per se rule for tying, which has long been
advocated by the Chicago School, see, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 365-81; Bowman, supra note 14,
received four votes in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
79. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-18 (1984) (discussing
nature of market power requirement in tying context); General Leaseways Inc. v. National Truck
Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton
Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.) (tying arrangement), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.); Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 19-23. The Supreme Court has not, however, adopted a
requirement of market power in all antitrust cases. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984).
80. See, e.g., III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58, ch. 7C; P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS
191 n.19 (3d ed. 1981) (citing commentary); Spivak, The Chicago SchoolApproach to Single Firm Exercises
of Monopoly Power: 4 Response, 52 AN~rRUST LJ. 651, 654-63 (1983) (discussing cases).
81. See, e.g., General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 595-96 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58, 714.2 (Supp. 1987).
82. The classic statement of the rule of reason is in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
83. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1974).
Not all advocating the use of economics in antitrust insist on an inherent tension between per se
rules and economics. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 50, at 8.
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That a per se prohibition against horizontal price fixing is generally suported
84
by those favoring an economic approach illustrates this point.
Complicating the choice between a per se rule and the rule of reason is the
ambiguity that surrounds their meaning, especially in the case of the latter.
Richard Posner has remarked that the "content of the Rule of Reason is
largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for
nonliability." 8 5 If one takes this remark seriously, then all calls for the rule of
reason (which are now heard in connection with every doctrine, except simple
horizontal price fixing) should be understood as either intentionally or
unconsciously disguised attempts to remove the area from antitrust scrutiny.
Frank Easterbrook has similarly criticized the rule of reason as being largely
devoid of content,8 6 and in its place advocates a series of five filters
(presumptions) through which a plaintiff must pass in order to demonstrate
liability. 8 7 In principle the approach of trying to design such presumptions,
where possible, is sound. Easterbrook's particular set, however, seems even
a8
more likely than the rule of reason to be tantamount to per se legality.
Finally, it should be noted that the rule of reason, as currently formulated,
does not permit the open-ended inquiry contemplated by statements equating
it with a complete economic analysis in that it will not consider economic
benefits of abandoning competition in particular instances.8 9
The preference for a market power proof requirement also appears to
involve the application of an economic approach, because economic analysis
indicates that, absent any such power, there can be no anticompetitive effect
from restrictive practices. Yet, as with the rule of reason, it does not
84.

See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. IlT Grinnel Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer,

J.); R. BORK, supra note 3, at 279 (naked price fixing).
85. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977); see also Foer, The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J.

331, 337-38 (1983) ("With only slight exaggeration, there is really only one thing one needs to know
about the rule of reason: when the rule of reason is applied, the defendant virtually always wins.").
86. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 9-14.
87. See id. at 14-39. One ambiguity in Easterbrook's framework concerns whether the plaintiff
who has passed through all five filters is deemed to have prevailed or must then still prove liability
under the rule of reason that Easterbrook has criticized.
88. See Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 529 n.57; see also id. at 544 n. 119 (criticizing part of
Easterbrook's foundation for his tendency to err in the direction of antitrust defendants). The
discussion that follows of the market power threshold also refers to one of Easterbrook's filters.
89. This is the holding of National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978); see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646-50 (1980). In their exuberance
to see recent Supreme Court doctrine as a wholesale adoption of their economic approach, some
Chicago School advocates have misunderstood this aspect of Engineers. For example, Peter Gerhart
claims that only "a literal interpretation" of Engineers might be seen as embodying the false equation
of competition and rivalry, see infra subsection IV-B-I, and the concomitant prohibition on
considering the benefits deriving from ethical or safety norms. See Gerhart, supra note 2, at 331. Yet
on the very next page he quotes the portion of Engineers that rules out consideration of precisely such
a defense. See id. at 332. Later in the article, he returns to his original claim. See id. at 342. As
another example, Thomas Kauper argues that this aspect of Engineers "can also be utilized to support
the contention that the Burger Court's antitrust doctrine is solely efficiency oriented," a rather
remarkable claim given his own characterization two sentences earlier that, under Engineers,
"[w]hether competition is economically, socially or politically undesirable is simply not a relevant
issue." Kauper, supra note 76, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
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immediately follow that economic analysis necessarily supports the rule that
most directly reflects its application. Consider the context of horizontal price
fixing. Frank Easterbrook has argued that the "market power inquiry logically
precedes the question of whether a restraint is 'naked' and thus within the
scope of the per se rule." 90 But such logic is formal at best. If a naked
horizontal price-fixing scheme has been detected, and one is virtually certain
that such schemes are undesirable, what sense does it make to require proof

of market power when such an inquiry is inevitably difficult and costly? 9 1 In
addition, even if market power must be established, one must decide how
much market power must be demonstrated, by what evidence, and with what
degree of confidence. Such requirements further suggest the complexity of
the link between an economic approach and particular antitrust rules. 9 2
The emergence of a marginal cost pricing test for predatory pricing could

also be seen as an outgrowth of the application of an economic analysis,
although much of the criticism of the Areeda-Turner test has come from the
most prominent economists who study antitrust. 93 A substantial portion of
the dispute concerns the appropriate role to be given complex dynamic

considerations that are central to predatory phenomena. Some of the more
recent court decisions on predatory pricing have veered from the AreedaTurner approach on precisely these grounds. 94 Disputes concerning whether
predatory investment and innovation should be treated similarly to predatory
pricing often turn on similar factors. 9 5 Arguments favoring the simpler
Areeda-Turner approach have, not surprisingly, been quite similar to those

90. Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 21.
91. See Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 547 n.127 (developing this criticism of Easterbrook
and defending Phillip Areeda, whom Easterbrook castigates for suggesting that there should be some
antitrust violations that do not require proof of market power, see Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 29
n.62).
In addition, one could infer market power from the intent implicit in the practice, which raises the
question of the role of inquiries into intent in an economic approach to antitrust, discussed later in
this subsection.
92. The Supreme Court has recently and clearly reaffirmed its rejection of a market power
requirement in cases involving naked restraints. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
93.

See, e.g., Baumol, Quasi-Permanenceof Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of PredatoryPricing,
1 (1979);Josko & Klevorick, A Frameworkfor Analyzing PredatoryPricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J.
213 (1979); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976);
Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); see also Joskow,
The Political Content of Antitrust: Comment, in ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONOMICS 196, 202 (0. Williamson
ed. 1980) (marginal cost pricing test has not prevailed "because of the triumph of economic
efficiency considerations in the interpretation of antitrust statutes").
94. See Spivak, supra note 80, at 655-62 (citing, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981) (prices above average variable cost
may be predatory; ultimate test based on effectiveness in achieving predatory purposes), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982)); Bordon, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 514-16 (6th Cir. 1982) (price manipulation
that achieves predatory purpose is a violation even if price is not below average variable cost), vacated
per stipulation, 461 U.S. 940 (1983)).
95. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58,
718-19, 721-22; Ordover & Willig, An
Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
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offered in support of per se rules rather than the rule of reason. 9 6 Discussion
of the marginal cost pricing test compliments that of the rule of reason in that,
although both have been associated with the economic approach, they
represent opposite choices in analytically similar situations. 9 7 This
juxtaposition does not indicate that either rule is mistaken; rather, it
reinforces the argument that there is no automatic connection between the
use of economic analysis and particular methods of formulating antitrust
rules.
As a final example, consider the hostility often associated with the

economic approach to antitrust and expressed with growing frequency toward
inquiries into defendants' intent in order to resolve antitrust disputes. The
basic problem is that the arguments rejecting altogether the relevance of
intent are often based primarily on mistakes commonly made in particular
inquiries into intent. More specifically, if intent is interpreted to encompass
the simple desire to operate so effectively as to surpass one's competitors, it
does not indicate any basis for antitrust liability. 98 It hardly follows, however,
that intent is irrelevant to an economic inquiry. 9 9 For example, clear evidence
that firms' intent in entering a complex joint venture arrangement was to use
their integrated activities as a cover for price fixing is relevant in determining
the likely effect of such an agreement. In determining the effects of allegedly
predatory behavior, one might be aided by evidence that a firm reduced its
prices to a lower level than was profit maximizing in the short run precisely
because it anticipated that this would bankrupt a new entrant, keep away
future entrants, and thus permit higher, monopolistic prices in the future.
It may reasonably be objected that such evidence will often be hard to
come by,' 0 0 and may necessitate costly discovery if deemed admissible. Yet it
96. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58, ch. 7C; Barry Wright Corp. v. [IT Grinnel
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-32, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer,J.) (explicitly making the analogy to per se
rules).
97. Another tension is that the marginal cost pricing test for predation assumes that the relevant
costs can be measured with reasonable accuracy. In that event, however, the market power inquiries
often thought necessary could employ similar information, without the need for market definition.
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 940-41 (1981).

98. This conclusion follows regardless of the strength or manner in which intent is expressed.
Intent to "crush, destroy, or mutilate" the competition is perfectly laudable if the method envisioned
is the production of a better product.
99. The Supreme Court in Chicago Board's famous discussion of the rule of reason approach
explicitly linked the utility of inquiries into intent to the understanding of the effects of behavior.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("the purpose or end . . . [is]
relevant . . . not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences"); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 n.48 (1962); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
100.

See, e.g., Areeda, in Are Economists Taking Over?, in CHANGING ANTITRUST

STANDARDS

24, 26

(Conf. Bd. Research Bull. No. 144, 1983). One reason often given is that lawyers, aware of the
relevance of such evidence, will advise that it be destroyed, or not created. Of course, there are some
ethical questions raised by such behavior, and even if there were not any prohibitions currently, it
would be possible to enact ethical or direct legal sanctions against such advice or practices by
attorneys or others. As to evidence never created, there are surely limits on the ability of large
corporations to make complex, long-range decisions, often involving the coordination of many
subdivisions, without any written communications. This is a rather large issue that has received far
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is hardly obvious that direct proof of the effects of various complex business
arrangements and practices-itself involving extensive discovery and heavy
reliance on expert witnesses-will be easier to come by, less costly, or more
reliable.' 0 ' Just as intent is often inferred from effects, 10 2 it is also reasonable
in many circumstances to infer effects from intent. After all, if one assumes, as
many Chicago School analysts are inclined to do, that firms in the market are a
better judge of the effects of practices than are courts,1 0 3 then it follows that
such evidence of intent should be given great weight indeed. This evidence
would necessarily be deemed superior to any attempt to reconstruct firms'
decisionmaking processes using expert witnesses in the course of litigation.l 0 4
An economic approach does, however, have much relevance to an intent
inquiry in that it will help determine which courses of action, if successful, are
likely to be detrimental. Economic analysis and inquiries into intent are not
inherently at odds. The question of how much weight one should place on
various evidence of a firm's intent is a difficult one, and the only substantial
insight economic theory is likely to offer is the general natural selection
argument that firms more able to fulfill their intentions are more likely to
10 5
survive than those that are not.
IV
HAS THERE BEEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC
ISSUES IN DECIDING ANTITRUST CASES? ECONOMICS AS A
GOAL VERSUS THE ONLY GOAL

The first two parts of this article suggest that there has not been any
significant increase in the degree to which the Supreme Court uses economic
analysis in addressing economic questions, and that changes in the content of
economic analysis over the past few decades have no necessary connection to
most developments in antitrust doctrine and even less of a link to many of the
positions advocated by the Chicago School of antitrust. This part examines a
third possible explanation: that the politics and ideology of the Court and
various antitrust analysts provide the best interpretation for much of the shift
that has been noted.
One commonly offered observation is that economic efficiencyregardless of the particular content or method of economic analysis-has
too little attention; the limited claim here is that it is hardly obvious a priori that an economic
approach should ignore this source of information.
101. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 59, at 110 (discussing predatory pricing).
102. Recall the common presumption that one intends the natural consequences of one's acts.
103. See supra subsection II1-B-1.
104. Frank Easterbrook has argued that antitrust defendants are often unaware of the effects of
their practices. See supra note 74; Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 5-6. In many of the relevant
contexts, this claim is implausible. See Kaplow, Leverage, supra note 45, at 543 n. 118. For example,
firms do not create complex joint ventures by accident, and they do not make major pricing decisions
by spinning roulette wheels. The claim in the text is not that firms' intent will always be clear to
those on the inside or readily ascertainable from without, but rather that it offers a rather obvious
potential source of information in many instances.
105. See supra subsection III-B-I.
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moved from being merely one of many dimensions of antitrust inquiry to the
sole, or at least the heavily dominant, objective of antitrust in the mind of the
Supreme Court. 10 6 Of course, even if a radical transformation along these
lines has taken place, the analysis presented in part III casts some doubt on
whether such a shift necessarily explains the changes in the content of
doctrine usually associated with the Chicago School. Nonetheless, such a
departure from past practice is unlikely to be without effect and would itself
reflect changes in the Court's approach that might have broader ramifications.
As the introduction to this article suggested, in the light of changes in
Supreme Court jurisprudence in many areas over the past decades, one
should expect to see parallel movements in antitrust.
Section A considers how much change has occurred over the past decade
in the Supreme Court's articulation of the purposes of the antitrust laws. The
07
general conclusion is that the alleged movement is typically overstated.
There are no clear affirmative statements embracing the philosophy that
economic efficiency is all. At most, one observes a relative absence of strong
statements concerning many competing objectives noted by the Court in the
past. 108

Section B interprets whatever change has occurred, as well as additional
movement that might well emerge in the future. Also considered in that
section are the political and institutional meanings of such a shift in
objectives. Of course, whenever a substantial shift in ultimate objectives
occurs, a strong political element is by definition present. Section B further
argues that such a change as the one discussed in connection with antitrust,
106. See, e.g., Spivak, supra note 80, at 672 & n.96 (discussing prominent Chicago School
adherents). Spivak also notes that Judge Posner has essentially ruled to this effect in many of his
recent antitrust opinions. See id. at 672 n.97; see also Changing Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge
Posner's Application of His Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 839, 881 (1983).
These claims are somewhat difficult to interpret. Posner does repeatedly cite Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979), to support the view that "consumer welfare"-by which the
Chicago School often means "efficiency to the exclusion of all other objectives"-has been endorsed
as the purpose of antitrust. This argument and interpretation concerning Reter v. Sonotone are
discussed in subsection IV-A-2.
This article will not explore the additional fallacy common in the efficiency-only approach: that
the concept of efficiency necessarily rules out direct consideration of "alternative" objectives. For
example, as Herbert Hovenkamp has noted, conventional free-rider arguments, which the Chicago
School emphasizes in explaining vertical restraints, could justify, on economic grounds, concerns for
political power and opportunity for small businesses. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 243.
107. Richard Markovits, a supporter of the Burger Court's changes, initially puts the argument
somewhat more realistically than most. "In short, although the tea leaves are admittedly scanty, the
Burger Court appears to be preparing an antitrust brew with an exclusively efficiency flavor."
Markovits, supra note 6, at 183. Yet, aside from this qualification, he proceeds as though there is very
little doubt. See, e.g., id. at 184 ("As we have seen, the mature Burger Court rejected the Warren
Court's noneconomic values."), 196 ("Burger Court has distinguished itself.., by insisting that the
antitrust laws contain an exclusively economic test of legality" (emphasis added)).
108. Even this later aspect is difficult to interpret, as the time period and number of cases is

sufficiently limited to leave some doubt as to the significance of any trend. After all, it has never been
claimed to be the case that dozens of opinions each decade in the past contained substantial
elaborations of the purposes of antitrust, including explicit emphasis on noneconomic objectives.
And numerous references to competing objectives still appear with moderate frequency in Supreme
Court opinions. For some examples, see subsection IV-A-2.
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when read against the background of the legislative and social history as well
as prior interpretations of the antitrust laws, contains an important activist
element, as that term is understood in the current legal and political
climate. 10 9 To the extent one takes seriously the claims of the current
national administration, recent judicial appointees, and their sympathizers,
this characterization of the changes supports the frequent allegation that
avowed opposition to judicial activism more often reflects opportunism rather
than any sincere, principled belief."10
A.

Assessing the Change in Antitrust Opinions

Although some have taken the view that, from the
1. The Early Cases.
beginning, the sole objective of the antitrust laws was to be economic
efficiency,"' there has never been any dispute over the fact that leading
antitrust opinions from the beginning have made explicit references to
broader purposes, such as the protection of small business, entrepreneurial
freedom, buyer freedom of choice, the maintenance of deconcentration both
as a way of life and to avert undue influence on the political process, and the
preservation or promotion of a fair distribution of income, particularly
between large economic enterprises and consumers. One of the first wellknown instances is Justice Peckham's reference in Trans-Missouri to "small
dealers and worthy men whose lives had been spent" in business. 1 12 In Alcoa,
Learned Hand stated that "[t]hroughout the history of these statutes it has
been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and
preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
13
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.""
Interestingly, both statements refer explicitly to the Sherman Act, which
has been the focus of the strongest claims to the effect that the antitrust laws
contemplated only economic efficiency, rather than the Clayton Act (including
the 1950 amendment to section 7) or the Robinson-Patman Act, where
efficiency-only proponents have been more willing to concede alternative
motivations. Moreover, these statements precede the Warren Court era, thus
indicating a long-standing pattern rather than a temporary shift during that
109. This article will not explore the important question of whether these conventional
interpretations are meaningful from various perspectives. Rather, it makes the rather modest claim
that alleged and advocated antitrust developments concerning the law's fundamental objectives fall
within the concept of activism as it is generally understood.
110. Many would question whether "principled" opposition to activism is conceptually coherent.
See supra note 109.
111. See infra subsection IV-B- 1.
112. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897). Interestingly,
although Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), an early Warren Court
decision, is perhaps most strongly associated with this view of antitrust laws, it contains no reference
to this statement in Trans-Missouri or similar statements, and devotes only passing attention to the
objectives of the antitrust laws, concluding its brief discussion by referring to the potential for
monopoly, as traditionally understood. See id.at 213-14.
113. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). For a discussion
of how this view might be reconciled with the statement in United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920), that size per se is not an offense, see Kaplow, Market Power, supra note 45,
at 1824 & n.20.
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time. When one moves to the Warren Court, and beyond the Sherman Act
context, similar statements can be found. The review of the legislative history
of the 1950 amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act in Brown Shoe includes
the following statement:
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments
was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy .... Other considerations cited in support of the bill were the
desirability of retaining "local control" over industry and the protection of small
businesses. Throughout the recorded discussion may be found examples of Congress'
fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on economic grounds,
but also the threat to other values a trend toward concentration was thought to
pose.114

Perhaps more important was the Court's later comment that, although
[i]t is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects[,] . . .we cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable,
small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.115

Antitrust court decisions up through the time of the Warren Court thus
clearly reflect the view that objectives other than economic efficiency,
narrowly construed, are part of the purposes of antitrust legislation.
2. Supreme Court Decisions of the Past Decade.
In light of the history briefly
recounted in subsection 1, it would indeed represent an important shift if the
Burger Court's recent decisions explicitly rejected earlier statements and
adopted the view that economic efficiency was the sole objective of the
antitrust laws. Most of the support for this frequently advanced description is
confined to a handful of passages in some of the Court's recent opinions. As
an initial observation, given that none of the referenced language spans more
than a sentence or two and none represents a direct attempt to address this
issue, it is impossible to make a persuasive claim beyond the argument that
such language constitutes hints of things to come. One rather obvious source
of support for this characterization of the evidence of a shift as modest at best
is the simple fact that the Court neither cites nor otherwise addresses any of
the well-known discussions of the multiple objectives position it has
supposedly rejected in recent cases.
It is best to begin the inquiry with the most widely cited Supreme Court
statement on the subject, that found in Reiter v. Sonotone: "On the contrary,
[the floor debates] suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
'consumer welfare prescription.' R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66
(1978)." 1 16 Believe it or not, that single sentence and citation has been the
major source of much of the argument. Not only is the evidence exceedingly
thin in quantity, it also falls far short of supporting the position that the goal
of economic efficiency, to the exclusion of all else, was therein adopted.
114.
115.
116.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
Id.at 344.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
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First, the phrase "consumer welfare prescription" admits substantial
ambiguity. Although Robert Bork and others may have economic efficiency in
mind, it would hardly be surprising if the Court intended a meaning more
literal and in accord with common usage-the welfare of consumers. That
interpretation, of course, often conflicts with economic efficiency. It excludes,
for example, economies that accrue to a firm but are not passed on to
consumers. In fact, this straightforward reading is more in accord with the
distributional interpretation of the Sherman Act's objectives. 17 One would
be hard-pressed to support either position based on this brief passage.",
A second major defect is that even if the statement in Reiter v. Sonotone is
interpreted as expressing the antitrust laws' concern with economic efficiency,
it does not on its face purport to exclude other objectives. Thus, the
statement is irrelevant to the question at hand because those who advocate a
multiple-goal interpretation and approach generally embrace efficiency as one
of the important goals. In fact, the context of the quotation clearly suggests
that the statement of the consumer welfare goal is being used in an inclusive,
rather than exclusive, fashion. The issue in Reiter v. Sonotone, after all, was
whether consumers who purchase products for their own use have standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act." 9 The context thus stands the exclusive
interpretation on its head, for it was conceded by all parties and apparently
agreed by the Court that various other potential plaintiffs-businesses in
particular-did have standing. Thus, to interpret the Court's remark as
referring only to consumers would be odd indeed.' 20 The only question was
whether consumers were to be included among those allowed to bring private
suits. It is hardly surprising that the Court provided a unanimous affirmative
response. 12 1 The paragraph containing the "consumer welfare" reference
exists to support the proposition that "[nlothing in the legislative history of
§ 4 conflicts with" the holding that injured consumers could bring private
suits. 1 2 2 The sentence preceding the reference to the floor debates refers to
the respondent's assertion that the language of section 4 "was clearly
intended to exclude pecuniary injuries" to consumers. 123
117. See, e.g., Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982).
118. The fact that the citation is to Judge Bork, who takes the efficiency view, is insufficient to
resolve the controversy. In addition to the arguments in text, it is clear that such a brief quotation
with no indication of context is inevitably difficult to interpret. Moreover, since there are numerous
clear statements of the efficiency view in Bork's book that were not quoted, it seems all the more
difficult to claim that this brief reference was meant to signal adoption of the efficiency view.
119. See 442 U.S. at 334.
120. In fact, the Chicago School position is that, in many contexts (when the affected businesses
are competitors of rather than purchasers from defendants), only consumers should be permitted to
sue. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 33-39. The Court's approach, taken as a whole, seems
more difficult to reconcile with that position than with one that considers goals beyond economic
efficiency.
121. But see 442 U.S. at 345-46 (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (worrying about the resulting increase
in litigation that will be produced, but seeing it as a question for Congress).
122. 422 U.S. at 342.
123. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
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The only remaining argument that could be offered to support the claim
concerning the historic significance of Reiter v. Sonotone is that the mere fact of
the reference to the first part of Bork's book reflects a wholesale adoption of a
new philosophy of antitrust. Gordon Spivak's assessment of this argument
provided a cogent reply: "Imagine that: the Supreme Court overruled
decades of antitrust precedents simply by quoting three words from Judge
Bork's book."

24

Nor do the rest of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements amount to
a wholesale revolution on this front. One of the strongest statements in
support of the Chicago School position is that found in BMI, indicating that
the Court's per se inquiry is to determine "whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output, .

.

. or instead one designed to 'increase

economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less
competitive.' "125 Yet statements to this effect are hardly new, as evidenced
by the Court's citation of Northern Pacific in support of this proposition. 2 6 In
addition, as the discussion in part III indicates, the focus on competition in
Engineers is not at all necessarily an endorsement of the efficiency approach, as
either an exclusive objective or otherwise.' 2 7 Surely additional passages
could be cited, but, given the extremely limited support offered by the
language most frequently employed in discussions of whether the efficiency
objective has fully triumphed, one cannot reasonably expect that even lesser
128
clues would substantially tip the balance.
124. Spivak, supra note 80, at 673; see also Comment, supra note 106, at 881 n.213.
125. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (quoting United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
126. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Northern Pacific is a Warren Court
decision, and one of the many that has come under attack from the Chicago School. See, e.g., R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 367.
127. See supra at 196 & note 89. Thus, only minimal support for the efficiency-only approach can
be gleaned from Engineers' references to competition and economics. See, e.g., 435 U.S. at 690-91 &
nn.16 & 17. It is also relevant that the entire discussion of these issues in Engineers appears in a
context wherein the Court was rejecting a defense that did not appeal to the frequently proffered
non-efficiency objectives of antitrust and would be ruled out quite readily by an ordinary
(For further exploration of the meanings of
interpretation of the word "competition."
"competition," see subsection IV-B-I.)
An example of the significance of this is Frank Easterbrook's thesis that "[t]he task of antitrust
policy is to find the right balance of competition and cooperation." Easterbrook, supra note 44, at
1707; see Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 1-2. Since the rule of reason explicitly states otherwise-i.e.,
only "competition" is deemed relevant-this is deeply problematic for his argument that the
Supreme Court's approach largely coincides with his.
128. Some further support for the claim that the Supreme Court has moved in the direction of
considering only efficiency can be found in a footnote in Sylvania, wherein the Court rejects a lower
court judge's appeal to "the autonomy of independent businessmen even though [the restrictions]
have no impact on 'price, quality, and quantity of goods and services.' " 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
Instead, the Court indicates that antitrust policy must be linked in some manner to "marketplace
considerations [to provide some] objective benchmarks." Id. Yet it specifically quotes Schwinn, 388
U.S. at 374, in rejecting the alternative interpretation, 333 U.S. at 53 n.21, suggesting that the
Court's statement in Sylvania can hardly be seen as a wholesale change from the Warren Court on
this question. To illustrate, the Warren Court's analysis in Brown Shoe, which is often noted for
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Not only is the affirmative support weak, but some modest language cuts
against the notion that efficiency now reigns alone. Maricopa 129 is probably
the decision most embarrassing to the Chicago School position in that it failed
to accept a more lenient approach toward maximum price fixing, as advocated
by Frank Easterbrook. 130 The Court placed "horizontal agreements to fix
maximum prices on the same legal--even if not economic-footing as

agreements to fix minimum or uniform prices."' 3'

Both Maricopa and

Associated General Contractors quoted language from Kiefer-Stewart concerning

the tendency of condemned practices to "cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgment."' 32 The existence of these opinions and the statements within
them cast further doubt on the claim that the Supreme Court has fully
133
reversed itself on the question of the goals of the antitrust laws.

Concerning both the objectives of antitrust, discussed in this part, and the
content of economic analysis, considered in part III, there is the danger of

drawing stronger inferences than warranted from the fact that a larger portion
of major antitrust decisions by the Burger Court had been in favor of antitrust

defendants, in cases where the Chicago School would support such results,
than was true of prior Courts. As a matter of logic, much of the optimistic
reading by Chicago School proponents 134 might be attributed to the following

invalid syllogism: (1) The Court has produced a given set of results; (2) this
set of results has been advocated by proponents of the new law and
economics of antitrust (the Chicago School); (3) therefore, the Supreme

Court has been convinced by and therefore has adopted the Chicago School's
economic interpretation of and approach to antitrust law.1 35 The hidden
premise necessary to make this argument valid is that it is impossible to reach
the Court's results without adopting the Chicago School position, lock, stock,
suggesting nonefficiency objectives of antitrust, did quite explicitly ground its decision in its analysis
of effects in the marketplace. The same is true with Alcoa.
Frank Easterbrook argues that many of the numerous decisions following his approach are
unanimous. See Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 1705 & n.23. It is unclear why it does not seem to him
important that almost half of the cases he lists reject his positions in whole or in part. (Most of the
directly relevant language in the other half of the cases has already been discussed.)
129. Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
130. See Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981).
131. 457 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
132. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951), cited in
Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982), and Associated Gen'l Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528-29 & n.18 (1983). Associated General
Contractors also indicated that adverse effects on "free choices between market alternatives is
inherently destructive of competitive conditions and may be condemned even without proof of its
actual market effect." Id. at 528 (citing Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 459 U.S. 207, 21014 (1959)).
133. As another example, although the Court's recent decision in NCAA emphasized effects on
price and output, 468 U.S. at 107, it also explicitly referred to competitors' ability to compete at two
points, id. at 107, 108.
134. The same can be said of similar readings by pessimistic opponents of the Chicago School.
135. The logic behind arguments that the Chicago School has triumphed is rarely this explicit;
perhaps coming closest is the statement in Kauper, supra note 76, at 5, although he finds
pronouncement of a Chicago School triumph somewhat premature, id. at 2, 6, 12. See also Markovits,
supra note 6.
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and barrel. In rebutting this argument, one obvious point is simply that many
of the more recent statements and decisions have been approved by a wide
array of commentators, including those hostile to the Chicago School. More
generally, recalling the argument in the introduction to this article concerning
general movements in Supreme Court decisionmaking as well as the role of
particular rationalizations for decisions,' 3 6 it would be a difficult task indeed
to establish that positions of any particular group of commentators have been
adopted by the Court.
B.

Political Meaning of the Change: Judicial Activism

To the extent one accepted the argument of section A sufficiently to
conclude that there has been no significant change in the Court's position
concerning the goals of the antitrust laws and further assumed that no further
substantial change in such a direction was imminent, the question would be
whether continuation of the past approach was warranted. Similarly, if one
believes that substantial change has already occurred or is on the horizonfor example, if it is going to be implemented, or at least attempted, in the
federal appellate courts-one would similarly have to assess the basis for past
and potential future approaches concerning the purposes of antitrust.
Subsection 1 explores the basis in the statutes and their legislative history for
various positions on this issue. It generally concludes that the interpretations
of the early courts were consistent with these foundations, suggesting that a
fundamental departure would constitute an activist move. Subsection 2
briefly explores the dissonance between the fundamental positive tenet of
Chicago law and economics as a whole (beyond the antitrust context), that the
common law develops in a manner that is inevitably efficient, and the central
battle cry of the Chicago School's position in antitrust, that antitrust
doctrine-which has been formed by an essentially common law process-has
quite frequently been inefficient. To the extent this inconsistency exists, it
reinforces the interpretation offered in this article concerning the primacy of
the political and ideological dimension to proposed and allegedly observed
shifts in antitrust law along the lines advocated by the Chicago School.
1. The Antitrust Statutes and Their History.
The very existence of continued
debate over whether the antitrust statutes and their legislative history
contemplate economic efficiency as the sole objective of antitrust doctrine is
striking. The position of some Chicago School advocates in this area
represents an instance in which their arguments are so farfetched that it is
hard to take them seriously; yet the continued advocacy of this position by
some 13 7 makes at least a limited discussion necessary. Moreover, even for
136.

On the latter, see supra note 7.

137.

See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, ch. 2; Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9J.

L. & EcON. 7 (1966). One of the most extreme statements is by Robert Bork:
There would be little point in reviewing here all of the positions that have been advanced
concerning the broad social, political, and ethical mandates entrusted to the courts through the
Sherman Act, or in naming the persons who have urged them, for there is not a scintilla of
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those advocates who make little use of the statutes and their legislative
history, the fact that they cut strongly against the view of efficiency as the sole
objective of the antitrust laws is relevant for interpreting the advocates'
implicit views concerning the role of the judiciary.
The claim that the antitrust laws contemplate economic efficiency as their
sole objective has a number of deficiencies, many of which are independently
sufficient to rule out the possibility.
First, those enacting the lawsparticularly in the case of the Sherman Act-could not have understood the
concept as we are now asked to believe they did. Second, if one accepts the
Chicago School's analysis of restrictive practices, the language of many of the
enactments is virtually impossible to reconcile with the idea of efficiency being
the sole objective. Third, the legislative history and political context of all the
enactments render the efficiency-only interpretation implausible.
Regardless of any ambiguity in the statute itself or in its legislative history,
it is virtually impossible that the Sherman Act could have been crafted with
only economic efficiency in mind. At this time in history, legislators gave little
attention to what economists had to say on such issues.' 38 If economists had
been consulted, the legislature would have known that the profession at that
time was generally hostile to the very idea of antitrust law.' 3 9 Perhaps most
decisive, economists of the day did not yet understand economic efficiency in
its current form. In particular, the most straightforward efficiency argument
against cartels and monopoly-the one the Chicago School has in mindrefers not to efficiency in production but rather to allocative efficiency, which
designates the welfare loss due to the misallocation of resources resulting
from purchase decisions that are based upon super-competitive prices. Yet, at
the time of the Sherman Act's passage, this aspect of efficiency was making
only its first appearance in economics literature, and it was not until decades
support for most such views anywhere in the legislative history. The only value other than
consumer welfare which is even suggested by the record is protection of small businessmen, but,
as will be argued, that value was given only a complementary and not a conflicting role. The
legislative history, in fact, contains no colorable support for application by courts of any value
premise or policy other than the maximization of consumer welfare. The legislators did not, of
course, speak of consumer welfare with the precision of a modern economist but their meaning was
unmistakable.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (in interpreting this quotation, one should keep in mind that "consumer
welfare" is meant to be synonymous with efficiency, as will be discussed further below).
The positions offered by Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook on this score are more modest.
See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 3, at 152-54. Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner
advocate that efficiency be the sole objective of antitrust, see I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58,
ch. IB, although they make their case largely on grounds of practicality, making only brief note of
the legislative history for the purposes of indicating that it is largely unilluminating, see id. $106.
138. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 200
(1965).
139.

See, e.g., id. at 200-02; W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 71-77 (1965);

Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 577 (1973); Rowe, supra note
16, at 1516 n.24; Rowe, in Are Economists Taking Over, supra note 100, at 24 ("Antitrust revisionists
today would resurrect Senator Sherman as a bearded Milton Friedman. But the Darwinian
economists of 1890 would not touch antitrust with a ten-foot pole."); Stigler, The Economists and the
Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (one "would have searched long and hard" in
1890 to find "any economist who had ever recommended" such a policy).
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later that economists generally came to understand and apply the concept. 140
It is thus inconceivable that members of Congress were motivated at all by
such an argument-much less solely motivated by it. 14

This is not to suggest

that efficiency was irrelevant. To the extent industrial combinations might be
the most efficient means of production, efficiency considerations constituted
an argument against antitrust law, or at least against excessive application.
Although such concerns can be found in the legislative debates, they can
hardly be read as constituting the sole basis favoring enactment of the
legislation.

142

The statutory language of antitrust legislation itself poses additional
problems for the Chicago School positions. If one accepts the arguments
advanced by some-that cartelization largely subsumes antitrust concerns
from an efficiency perspective14 3 -then the rest of the antitrust laws,
including section 2 of the Sherman Act, which are seen as conflicting with
efficiency, must necessarily be explained by resort to other objectives.' 4 4 In
addition, practices such as tying and exclusive dealing are alleged generally to
be efficient, although they are specifically targeted by section 3 of the Clayton
Act. Mergers are considered unproblematic unless they raise cartelization (or
perhaps monopolization) concerns already covered by the Sherman Act,
requiring that section 7 of the Clayton Act, which was subsequently enacted
and amended precisely to strengthen the Sherman Act prohibitions, be read
as a redundancy that can safely be ignored. Finally, the Robinson-Patman
Act, which is generally viewed as most clearly contrary to efficiency, is to be
disregarded, perhaps by interpreting it (like the Clayton Act) in such a
manner that no action would constitute a violation.' 4 5 Although all of the
140. The Sherman Act was passed at the beginning of 1890. Mike Scherer has noted that
Marshall's first edition, which initially brought this concept of deadweight loss to Anglo-American
economics, did not appear until 1890, with the only earlier references being an "obscure Englishlanguage precursor" originally published in 1871 and a variant that was published in French in 1844.
See Scherer, supra note 45, at 977 & n.20; see also Lande, supra note 117, at 88 n.97.
141. Robert Bork and others make much of references in the debates to higher prices and lower
output, which are the twin effects of monopoly that result in a loss of allocative efficiency. See, e.g., R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 61-62; Bork, supra note 137, at 14-21. To note those effects, however, is a far
cry from being motivated by notions of efficiency. These arguments are consistent with general
concerns for consumers or small business purchasers, including concerns for the distribution of
income. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 117, at 83-96 (suggesting that income distribution was in fact the
original and primary concern); Scherer, supra note 45, at 979 ("Congress was concerned at least as
much with income distribution effects (which were well-understood in 1890) as with efficiency effects
(which were not)."). Thus, the reference to price and quantity can be explained most persuasively in
a manner suggesting that efficiency was not even one of Congress' concerns. Regardless, the
references to many other purposes, discussed in the remainder of this subsection, make it clear that
efficiency was not the sole objective.
142. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 117, at 89-93.
143. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 405-06 (also including mergers to monopoly and some
predation); R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 212-17.
144. One argument sometimes advanced is that efficiency was the sole motivation for most or all
of the enactments, but that it was misunderstood. As a result, one should follow the objectives and
ignore, or read in a manner to render moot, all the conflicting statutory language, no matter how
explicit. An example involving the interpretation of "competition" in the Clayton Act is discussed
below.
145. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 50, at 9. But see Breyer, supra note 50, at 9 (disagreeing with Bork).
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proscriptions in the antitrust statutes are at least somewhat ambiguous-and
section 1 of the Sherman Act is the height of ambiguity, unless it is read
sufficiently literally as to prohibit virtually all contracting-they are not wholly
without content. Moreover, the content they contain is often inconsistent
with economic efficiency if one accepts the Chicago School's views concerning
46
what is efficient.'
One particular question of interpretation of the statutory language-the
meaning of "competition" in many of the antitrust provisions-arises in
numerous contexts and has been the focus of substantial attention. The
Chicago School position is that competition should be taken to mean
economic efficiency, rather than some notion of business rivalry that would
include the preservation of large numbers of competitors or entrepreneurial
freedom as part of the objective.1 4 7 A commonly advanced corollary to this
position is that competitors should not be permitted to bring antitrust
suits.14 8 This interpretation, of course, is directly opposed to the sort offered
49
in Brown Shoe, discussed previously.1
Robert Bork, who perhaps devotes the most attention to the issue, has

recognized that "competition" has meanings in regular usage other than the
one he advocates.i t5 He claims, however, that various reasons justify his
interpretation and that his reading "[s]urely . . . is consistent with everyday
speech."i1I
Yet because most who speak on the subject do not even
understand what Bork and other Chicago School adherents mean by
146. Viewing the statutes alone-ignoring the earlier argument concerning when allocative
efficiency first came to be understood, problems with interpreting "competition," and the legislative
history-one might be able to resurrect an efficiency-only position if one thought many practices that
are the target of the antitrust laws were in fact inefficient. See also supra note 144.
147. See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner,
J.); University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (in
referring to the argument that rivalry is not an objective: "That 'there's a special providence in the
fall of a sparrow,' Hamlet, Act V, sc. II, line 232, is not the contemporary philosophy of antitrust.");
Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Foster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.); R. BORK, supra note 3, 51, 58-61, 91 (the "whole task of antitrust... [is] to improve...
efficiency"); Gerhart, supra note 2, at 321, 330-31; Fox, supra note 1, at 37 (discussing statements of
former FTC Chairman Miller). Frank Easterbrook implicitly takes this position in Easterbrook, Is
There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 714-15 (1982). Although this argument is
usually reserved for the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, he also asserts that "the Sherman
Act is written in the language of 'competition,' and economic terms," id.at 714, which is rather
surprising since the word does not appear anywhere in that enactment.
As a simple example, this interpretation would presumably permit a merger of all firms in an
industry-thus eliminating all competition-so long as there were sufficient economies of scale,
despite § 7's flat prohibition on mergers that "may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or...
tend to create a monopoly."
148. This position is advanced in Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 33-39, and expressed in many of
Richard Posner's antitrust opinions. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261,
266-67 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985); cases cited supra note 147.
149. See supra at 202.
150. See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 58 n.*.
151. Id. at 61. Quite striking is his statement that since the models implicit in the Clayton Act
"are derived from economics rather than-sociology or political science, this usage would seem to rule
out all but economic goals." Id. at 58. Similar pseudo-deduction would, for example, rule out all
public health objectives in statutes promoting competition in the health sector and would rule
economic considerations out of much defense procurement and many other areas.
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efficiency, the notion that theirs is one of the common uses of "competition"
is problematic. Although hardly decisive, standard dictionary definitions of
"competition" offer as a synonym "rivalry," the Chicago School's excluded
meaning, and all the definitions offered refer to the rivalry concept, none
admitting the Chicago School's meaning.' 52 Not only does the Chicago
School economic interpretation directly contradict common usage, 153 it also is
inconsistent with the usage of the term by economists, who do mean rivalry
rather than economic efficiency when they refer to "competition." The
standard definitions of perfect competition and monopolistic competition,
both of which stress rivalry,' 54 make this fact apparent. Moreover, economists
have no reason to define "competition" as "efficiency" because they have
explicitly adopted separate terms for the two concepts. Economic theorists go
about proving that competition produces efficiency in some circumstances
and inefficiency in others; the language by which they describe their efforts
clearly reveals that they use "competition" to describe the process of
interaction (existence of rivalry, specified in various ways) and "efficiency" to
characterize the properties of the result of many processes, of which
competition is only one.' 5 5 It is clear that "competition" means economic
15 6
efficiency in the minds of a few antitrust advocates and no one else.
The efficiency-only interpretation also is clearly contrary to the legislative
history of all the antitrust statutes. A few highlights from the rather familiar
story should suffice. The legislative history of the Sherman Act-which is the
only antitrust enactment Chicago School advocates even attempt to address
seriously' 5 7-reveals countless references to nonefficiency objectives. These
152. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 230 (1977).
153. By directly contradict, I mean that, as between the two definitions under consideration, the
one the Chicago School castigates is precisely the one implied by common usage and the one they
advocate has no connection whatsoever to common usage.
154. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs 234-35, 302 (2d ed. 1975).
155. See, e.g., T. KooPMANS, THREE ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 1-126 (1957); H.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 136-57 (1978). One can also compare the definitions of

"competitive markets," "monopolistic competition," and "perfect competition"-all defined in
terms of large numbers of entities, each of limited significance-and those of "allocative efficiency"
and "pareto optimum"-defined in terms of economic performance-in D. PEARCE, THE DICTIONARY
OF MODERN ECONOMICS 14, 74-75, 292-93, 325, 329 (1981). See also THE McGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 90-91 (D. Greenwald, et al., 3d ed. 1983) (defining "competition" in terms of rivalry).
156. Robert Bork goes so far as to argue that to the extent Congress meant something other than
"what we usually think of as competition"-i.e., if Congress meant rivalry and not efficiency-it
constitutes "a fraud upon the electorate." Bork, supra note 50, at 9 (emphasis added).
Another problem is that the Chicago School interpretation of "competition," when combined
with their view that many practices cited in those sections of the antitrust laws referring to injury to
competition are never anticompetitive in the sense of impairing efficiency, essentially reads much of
the antitrust prohibitions out of existence. See supra at 208-09; Fox, supra note 77, at 572-73.
Although this is defended as the only way to make sense of the provisions, such a conflict would not
arise if "competition" were read in a manner more in accord with common usage and the legislative
history of the provisions.
157. A striking example is in a recent paper by Frank Easterbrook, who, in response to Herbert
Hovenkamp's discussion of legislative history (which explicitly makes this point, see, e.g., Hovenkamp,
supra note 12, at 249-50), only addresses the Sherman Act. See Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 170205. In addition, one of his main arguments is that the efficiency-only approach differs little from a
broader one, see id. at 1703, which makes one wonder what to make of the large portion of Chicago
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references are consistent with all theories concerning the political climate
surrounding the law's enactment. 58
The Robinson-Patman
Act,
implemented during the New Deal, was explicitly directed toward protecting
small business. 159 The very nature of the strong economic criticism that this
Act has received attests to the fact that its objectives are not solely (if at all)
the promotion of economic efficiency. 160 Another clear example, the 1950
amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act,1 6 1 was expressly directed at social
and political aspects of economic concentration, as well as the protection of
small business, rather than at enhancing economic efficiency. 16 2 Thus, even
relatively more recent congressional action, taken after modem concepts of
efficiency had become widely known, at least among economists, unmistakably
School argument that explicitly criticizes prior decisions and commentary for admitting other
objectives into the analysis and thereby producing bad results.
Much of Easterbrook's defense of the efficiency-only approach makes no attempt to ground itself
in the statute or legislative history. For example, he insists that a multiple objective approach is not
"sane", id. at 1703-04-a position hardly consistent with the teachings of economics. Compare R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 79-80 (rejecting the propriety of a multiple objective approach), with
Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 135 (criticizing the focus on one economic consideration when others
are also implicated). Moreover, he selects as the single goal the only one that could not have been
intended by Congress.
158. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 138, at 199-200 ("Among the three [goals], the economic
[one] was the most cluttered with uncertainties, so much so that it seems to be no exaggeration to
regard antitrust as being essentially a political rather than an economic enterprise." (footnote
omitted)), 205-11; H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, ch. 4 (1955); Fox, The Modernization
of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1147-48 (1981); Lande, supra note 117, at
82-106; Rowe, supra note 16, at 1513-17; Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 1
(1985) (suggesting protection of small business as a primary motivation). Richard Hofstadter traces
some of the changes in views concerning antitrust, business, and the economy since that time, see R.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 138, at 212-28, although the most recent major substantive antitrust
legislation, the 1950 amendment to Clayton Act § 7, evidences that similar motivations to those at
the time of the Sherman Act were clearly central.
159. See, e.g., Jefferson County Pharm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 170-71
(1983); R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 138, at 221; Hansen, Robinson-PatmanLaw: A Review and Analysis,
51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113 (1983); Rowe, supra note 16, at 1519 (quoting Rep. Patman advocating a
"policy of live and let live." "protect[ing] the weak against the strong and prevent[ing] men from
injuring one another," 80 CONG. REC. 3447 (1936)).
160. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 382-401 ("antitrust's least glorious hour"); F.M. SCHERER,
supra note 67, at 580-82 (questioning whether beneficiaries include any except attorneys involved in
litigation concerning application of the provision).
161. The original Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, both passed in 1914,
reflected objectives similar to those involved in enactment of the Sherman Act-objectives other than
economic efficiency. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 117, at 106-30.
162. See, e.g., Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 311-23; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 233-38 (1960); Cann, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuitof
Economic "Objectivity ". Is There Any Rolefor Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 273, 277-84 (1985); Fox, supra note 158, at 1149-51; Lande, supra note 117, at 130-42; Rowe,
supra note 16, at 1523-24. Derek Bok's statement provides a good summary of the legislative history
as it relates to the issue of objectives:
To anyone used to the preoccupation of professors and administrators with the economic
consequences of monopoly power, the curious aspect of the debates is the paucity of remarks
having to do with the effects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency.
To be sure, there were allusions to the need for preserving competition. But competition
appeared to possess a strong socio-political connotation which centered on the virtues of the
small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature.
Bok, supra, at 236-37.
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reflects motivations other than, and sometimes in opposition to, economic
63
efficiency. 1
Thus, it is not merely eight decades of "aberrant" court opinions but also

a clear indication in both the statutes and their legislative history that
supports the proposition that economic efficiency does not constitute the sole
objective of the antitrust laws.'164 It thus is hardly surprising that some who

hold views close to those of the Chicago School have called for the repeal or
65
substantial modification of significant portions of the antitrust statutes.'

The entire history is sufficiently uncertain and vague that no particular pattern
of antitrust doctrine can be defended against all others as a simple matter of
fidelity to Congress. Furthermore, notions of economic efficiency surely
constitute an important component of any sensible interpretation of the
antitrust statutes. For the courts to proclaim efficiency as the sole objective of

antitrust, however, would constitute a substantial political act indeed, and
precisely the sort that would be condemned by those who generally counsel
judicial restraint and defend the judicial role as being distinct from that of the

legislature.
Until now,
2. Efficiency of the Common Law versus Inefficiency of Antitrust Law.
most of the discussion of the new law and economics of antitrust has been
presented without consideration of the more recent and wider movement in

law and economics, 166 significant elements of which are particularly associated
with a "Chicago School." Juxtaposing developments in both areas is
illuminating, especially since the central tenets of the two Chicago Schools are

in conflict. This conflict arises from the major proposition of the Chicago
School of law and economics that the common law is efficient'

67

-in

contrast

163. Interestingly, economists and other scholars interested in and informed about the antitrust
laws have interpreted the legislation in political and social terms rather than as focused primarily,
much less exclusively, on economic efficiency. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 138, at 233.
Frederick Rowe develops the argument that economic concentration, broadly construed, rather
than economists' concepts of market power and efficiency, were historially at the core of the antitrust
enactments, and the economic approach did not emerge until it was employed as part of an
aggressive litigation strategy in the 1940's aimed at making it easier, rather than more difficult, to
find antitrust liability. See Rowe, supra note 16, at 1521-22, 1524, 1529-32, 1560-61.
164. Interestingly, Richard Posner cites the Sherman Act as one of the statutes he would
characterize, like some constitutional provisions, as used by courts more as pretexts for their
decisions, wherein the language is never explicitly referenced and the case law is used as both the
beginning and end of the inquiry. See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 278. He similarly suggests that the
common law nature of the antitrust statutes, see infra subsection IV-B-2, may free the judge from
having to consult the legislators' values at all. See, R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 288. Of course, as
demonstrated in section A of this part, Posner would have to free himself of the case law, as well as
the statutes and their legislative history, in order to leave sufficient room for him to advance the
efficiency-only approach toward antitrust.
165. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 7, 212-17. Recent Reagan Administration proposals and
statements by particular officials could also be noted.
166. The use of economics in antitrust has been explicitly distinguished from the new law and
economics more generally. See supra at 184.
167. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3; Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 281, 287-97 (1979). "[Tlhese problems [with the economic theory of the common law] do
not include the alleged inadequacy of "efficiency" . .. as a normative criterion. The positive theory

Page 181: Autumn 1987]

ANTITRUST, LAws

& ECONOMICS,

AND THE COURTS

213

to claims that it should be efficient or that economic analysis is useful in
16 8
predicting the effects of common law rules.

Antitrust law may not appear to fit within this framework, but the conflict
appears once one recognizes that antitrust has long been viewed in many
respects as a common law subject-in light of its common law origins in the
law of restraint of trade and its development for nearly a century by courts
faced with the task of interpreting many rather open-ended enactments.16 9 In
fact, Congress apparently contemplated a common law type of development

when it enacted the Sherman Act.' 70 In his recent book on federal courts,
Richard Posner notes the tension that results from this recognition:
But at another level the inclusion of antitrust [as a "quasi" common law field] may
seem simply to demonstrate the fatuity of my enterprise of associating federal
common law with economic efficiency. For is it not the teaching of an extensive
literature-to which I, among many others, have contributed-that the courts, in
interpreting the antitrust statutes, have misused economic principles to produce a
body of doctrine fairly riddled with economic fallacies?171

In fairness, Posner explicitly limits himself to a brief discussion of this
question, 172 but given the potential importance of this fundamental
contradiction in two extensively developed lines of work, his attempted
resolution is worth considering.
The primary argument he offers for distinguishing antitrust is that, during
the Warren Court, 173 the government brought a large portion of the cases
and was permitted direct appeal to the Supreme Court, with the result that
says only that the common law appears to be an engine of wealth maximization, not that it should be
one." Id. at 291 (emphasis in original).
168. More recently, Richard Posner's writings have devoted considerable attention to the
proposition that efficiency (wealth maximization) should be the objective of the common law. See, e.g.,
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEG. STUD. 103 (1979). This
claim has been subject to extensive debate. See, e.g.,
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
HOFsTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 191 (1980); Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9J. LEG. STUD. 227 (1980). There is no doubt, however,
that Posner continues to maintain his descriptive claim independently.
Many law and economics scholars not associated with the Chicago School have devoted most of
their attention neither to whether the common law is efficient nor to whether it should be, but rather
to predicting the effects of common law rules and determining which are efficient and which are not.
See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983); Shavell, Strict Liability versus
Negligence, 9J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1980).
169. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); II
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58, ch. 3A; R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 288, 301; Baxter,
Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 661, 662-73 (1982); Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 706 & n.5; Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation
and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL. 87, 93 (1984).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.)
("Congress has incorporated into the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards of the common law"),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 58, 302.
171. R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 301.
172. See id.
173. Posner's focus on the Warren Court might suggest that the rejection of the efficiency
approach was an aberration of that era, contrary to the clear indications in section IV-A. For
example, Learned Hand's prounouncements in Alcoa, see supra at 201, as well as his discussion of
monopolization, preceded and were accepted by the Supreme Court well before that time period.
Other cases frequently criticized were in the 1930's and 1910's.
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only a handful of judges were determining antitrust doctrine. 174 Posner
claims that a "[p]olicy so determined is unlikely to be very stable." 17 5 The
question, however, is why such an approach would interfere with the general
efficiency properties of the common law. All federal common law is largely
determined ultimately by the Supreme Court. Although in other areas there
may have been appellate court opinions to lend assistance, it is difficult to see
how the lack of an intermediate opinion would fundamentally alter either the
quality and consistency of Supreme Court opinions or the basic objectives
that were pursued. The persuasiveness of a distinction on this ground is even
more dubious in light of the fact that many of the district court opinions are
famous for their care (and length), and a number were crafted by the most
respected federal judges of their time. In addition, despite the fact that
antitrust law may shift over generations more rapidly than does the common
law, 176 section IV-A demonstrated that one result has been largely constant
for nearly a century: The courts have been guided by objectives other than
efficiency. Moreover, in the past decade, where direct appeal to the Supreme
Court was no longer available, the alleged movement toward efficiency that
Posner applauds is attributed to Supreme Court decisions, and not traced in
any way to lower courts.' 7 7 Thus, to the extent there has been a substantial
move in the efficiency direction, it seems rather difficult to attribute it to this
procedural change rather than, for example, to more general currents in the
Supreme Court over the past fifteen years.
There exists, of course, another rather direct way to resolve this
contradiction. One could argue that antitrust is not really a common law
174.
175.

See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 302.
Id. In claiming that the Court has since played a smaller role, having "relatively infrequent

occasions when it decides antitrust cases these days," id. at 302-03, one would infer that the number
of antitrust opinions rendered each year by the Supreme Court had substantially decreased, but
examination of statistics appearing in the Harvard Law Review that summarize the Supreme Court's
docket each Term over the past few decades and direct computer searches reveal that the decline, if
any, is insubstantial. (The mean may have fallen from approximately five full opinions per Term to
slightly over four, and the variance is less.) A recent compilation shows that the large decrease in
government-initiated cases is significantly offset by the increase in private antitrust cases, and that
there was little decline from the early Burger Court (over half the cases arising when the expediting
act was in effect) to the later Burger Court. See Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 1051-52 (1985). Moreover, it is not clear why it would be that

having a smaller group of cases in a given time period facilitates development of the common law
either in a more orderly fashion or in an efficiency direction.
176. Given recent developments in products liability law, landlord-tenant law, and other areas,
this assumption is hardly obvious. It is offered in the text merely for the sake of argument.
177. Some of the more important of these decisions applauded by the Chicago School involved
reversals of the lower courts. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 66 U.S. 2 (1984);
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). In addition, Sylvania was
applauded for overruling Schwinn, but this was not the basis for the decision in the appellate court,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). General Dynamics, which is often
regarded as heralding the new era, was a direct appeal under the expediting act, United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). Of course, with the recent judicial appointments of
appellate court judges associated with an economic approach, and in particular that of the Chicago
School, the Supreme Court can expect in the future to have ever more guidance from appellate
courts to educate them in an efficiency direction.
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subject after all because the statutes, as explained in subsection IV-B-l,
simply give too much of a directive to take an approach other than one
focused exclusively on economic efficiency. As to the antitrust enactments
after the Sherman Act, Posner does offer this point as a partial explanation. 78
Once this out is taken, however, the argument comes full circle: If the
resolution of the apparent contradiction requires the claim that the antitrust
laws preclude the efficiency approach, then the activism that would be
involved in interpreting them as advocated by the Chicago School of antitrust
79
becomes all the more clear.1
V
CONCLUSION

Important changes in antitrust law have occurred over the past fifteen
years. The thesis of this article is that this shift has been misunderstood-not
as to the content of the newly evolved doctrine, but rather as to the
explanation for the change. The Introduction suggested that these
developments are more plausibly understood in the context of broader, and
in many respects parallel, shifts in all the Supreme Court's decisions. The
preceding discussion supports this conclusion. As part II demonstrated, it
simply is not the case that economic analysis is used substantially more
frequently in examining economic issues. Part III indicated that, although
economic analysis has changed substantially in the past five decades, the
Chicago School of antitrust and many of the doctrinal shifts by the Supreme
Court are hardly necessary outcomes of such a change. Finally, part IV
indicated how changes in the purported objectives of antitrust in the direction
of considering only economic efficiency have been overstated. Moreover, to
the extent these changes have occurred or will occur in the future, they are
best understood as an activist recreation of antitrust rather than as any
80
attempt to return to the statutes or their original meaning.'
Overall, recent changes in antitrust-actual or advocated-are in large
respect a function of politics, even though the position advocated is defined in
178. See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 302.
179. Another tension between these two areas arises from Posner's advocacy of the efficiency of
common law characterization based primarily on his interpretation of observed evidence (court
decisions), even in the absence of a compelling theoretical basis for this alignment. See, e.g., Samuels
& Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 Irr'L REV. L. ECON. 107, 108 (1984). Yet it is
precisely such an approach by those using case studies to explore industrial organization that Posner
has criticized. See supra at 189.
180. In an early survey of the Burger Court's antitrust jurisprudence, Posner explicitly advanced
the position that the Court's primary difference from the Warren Court was its less activist, more
restrained approach. See Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 ANrrrrlusT L.J. 819, 82125 (1978). The primary reasons offered for this conclusion were the narrow grounds for decision
offered (noting the exception of Sylvania, and not describing instances of Warren Court activism) and
greater "deference to district court fact findings in the defendant's favor." Id. at 822. If the Burger
Court has in fact made little change in antitrust doctrine, it could hardly be characterized as activist.
But the changes attributed to it by many are contrary to such a reading, in which case section IV-B's
analysis indicates the appropriateness of an activist characterization.
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terms of economics. In this respect, antitrust resembles constitutional law.' 8 '
Of course, when shifts in Supreme Court doctrine arise, one should not be
surprised to observe the Court referring to academic literature supporting the
results in order to lend further credibility to its opinions, 8 2 just as the Warren
Court used economics and cited relevant literature in support of its
opinions. 183
One direct ramification of characterizing the Chicago School approach as
activist is that the appointment of Chicago School advocates to the bench
would appear inconsistent with the stated policy of the national
administration against judicial activism and in opposition to any appointments
who might not share this view.' 8 4 It is not only that Chicago School adherents
advocate the reversal of long-standing precedents, such as Dr. Miles'
prohibition of resale price maintenance, 8 5 but that its position is substantially
at odds with congressional enactments over almost a century. Of course, this
contradiction between opposition to activism and the desire to reshape the
antitrust laws would be unimportant if, as is frequently suggested, rhetoric
concerning judicial activism and fidelity to Congress is reserved for areas in
which one favors or opposes particular results. If one is to take any cues from
antitrust, the best explanation for the appointment of federal judges
associated with the law and economics of the Chicago School is not a desire to
improve the economic sophistication of the federal judiciary but rather an
attempt to further the effort to have the composition of the judiciary reflect
particular political views.' 8 6 Thus, the title of this conference-Economists
on the Bench-and of this session-Impact of Economically Sophisticated
Judges on Economically Sensitive Areas of the Law-convey a misleading
impression of what these recent events have been about.

181. It is relevant that in both areas, as well as in most others, Burger Court changes generally do
not reflect changes in the opinions of the same Justices over time, but rather the fact that recent
appointees decide cases differently than those replaced. Major doctrinal changes in antitrust history
have similarly reflected changing personnel. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911) (both Justices remaining from earlier, anti-rule-of-reason cases retained same position).
182. See supra note 7. Eleanor Fox has noted how the Chicago School economic approach may be
a politically congenial source of support given contemporary mixes of political forces. See Fox, supra
note 77, at 588.
183. See supra part Ii.
184. Not surprisingly, recent Chicago School appointees, like most, claim to be opposed to
judicial activism. See, e.g., Bork, Emerging Substantive Standards-Developments and Need for Change, 50
ANTITRUST L.J. 179, 180 (1982) (criticizing alleged activism of Warren Court antitrust decisions);
Easterbrook, supra note 169.
185. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons. Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The effect of a
potential reversal is heightened by Congress' recent repeal of the 1930's statute that overrode the
prohibition under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
186. The Administration's 1987 nominations of Supreme Court Justices bear this out. Eleanor
Fox's conclusion concerning former FTC Chairman Miller provides a useful contrast. See Fox, supra
note 1, at 54-55.

